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For the last two decades, microfinance has ranked high on
the list of policy instruments for fighting poverty. Supporting
the creation of access to formal financial services for low-
income households holds out the promise of improving the
living conditions of poor families and fostering economic
development. Furthermore, it is claimed to be a very cost-
effective approach because some non-governmental
organizations ( NGOs) that have been upscaled into
microbanks have shown that financial services can be offered
to low-income households while covering costs and even
earning a moderate profit. Recent studies, however, are
sceptical about the high expectations raised by the
microfinance approach, since profitable microfinance
institutions (MFIs) are the exception rather than the rule.
Institutional innovation is called for in order to reproduce
these rare successes on a larger scale. This article aims to
offer preliminary insights into the potential of two rather
new institutional alternatives to upscaling: the creation of
microfinance departments at existing for-profit banks (i.e.,
downscaling) and the founding of greenfield banks.
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The glimmer of hope raised by the “microfinance
promise” could hardly be captured any more vividly
than in this opening passage of Jonathan Morduch’s
lead article of the same title in the December 1999 issue
of Journal of Economic Literature. The essay deserves
to be considered a milestone in the literature on
microfinance, for two reasons.
— Firstly, the topic of microfinance had for years
received broad attention from development
practitioners and politicians alike. However, up to
the time of that publication, interest in the topic
had been confined to a small community of
scientists leading a rather closed-shop existence.
Morduch’s achievement was to introduce the topic
to a broad range of economists in academia.
— Secondly, the paper explicitly states that despite
the millions of dollars of donor aid that for more
than two decades were devoted to and are still
flowing into the building of microfinance
institutions (MFIs) “the greatest promise of
microfinance is so far unmet, and the boldest claims
do not withstand close scrutiny” (Morduch, 1999,
p. 1571).
What is the promise of microfinance all about?
What hopes have so far been disappointed? The basic
idea of microfinance is fairly simple: the development
of the financial market through the creation of access
to formal financial services for low-income households
—and, more importantly, for small-scale entrepreneurs
and microentrepreneurs— gives beneficiaries the
opportunity to help themselves. They can escape
poverty by stabilizing their consumption streams and
by obtaining investment loans to improve their
businesses, thereby raising household income,
contributing to job creation and fostering the
development of a vibrant sector of small enterprises as
well as economic growth in general. Furthermore
—and this seems to be the most attractive feature of
the microfinance approach— fighting poverty by
offering access to financial services holds out the
promise of being relatively cost-effective. After an
initial phase of subsidized institution-building, MFIs are
supposed to reach financial sustainability.2 The
promoters of the microfinance movement are convinced
that financial services for the poor can be organized so
as to cover costs, enabling MFIs to survive in the market
without any further financial support and even to earn
a moderate profit. If this could indeed be achieved,
microfinance would create a “win-win solution”
advantageous to poor clients and the owners of MFIs
alike. With no need for further fuel in the form of
continual subsidies, the commercial forces of the
financial market could continue to fight poverty as if
they were a perpetuum mobile.
I
Motivation: can proper institution-
building make the microfinance
promise come true?
“About one billion people globally live in households with per capita incomes
of under one dollar a day. The policymakers and practitioners who have been
trying to improve the lives of that billion face an uphill battle…
Amid the dispiriting news, excitement is building about a set of unusual
financial institutions prospering in distant corners of the world—especially
Bolivia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The hope is that much poverty can be
alleviated —and that economic and social structures can be transformed
fundamentally— by providing financial services to low-income households.
These institutions, united under the banner of microfinance, share a
commitment to serving clients that have been excluded from the formal
banking sector....”1
1 See Morduch, 1999, p. 1569. 2 See Krahnen and Schmidt (1994).
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The evidence examined in Morduch’s paper gives
reason to be sceptical about how realistic feasible
microfinance really is. Concerning the impact on
poverty, very few empirical studies actually monitor
the data of MFI customers for possible biases.3
Therefore, other than some illustrative case studies,
empirical evidence of a positive impact of microfinance
on clients’ living conditions and job creation is scarce.
Furthermore, there also seems to be good reason to
question the claim that microfinance —after a limited
period of subsidized institution-building— can develop
into a zero-cost weapon against poverty. Although many
MFIs can point to considerable successes in assessing
the credit risk of microfinance clients once presumed
to be “unbankable”, “high repayment rates have seldom
translated into profits as advertised” (Morduch, 1999,
p. 1571). The dream of MFIs creating a “win-win
solution” and of commercial banking becoming a
driving force in fighting poverty seems to be highly
unrealistic. Of the thousands of MFIs in the world, only
a handful of flagship institutions are really meeting their
dual mission of serving the target group of the poor
and simultaneously being financially sustainable.
In the light of these sobering facts, Morduch
concludes that one needs to be more realistic about the
microfinance promise, although without giving it up
altogether. The idea of offering self-help in the form of
access to financial services is simply too attractive to
be abandoned, not least because the history of
microfinance has shown that considerable
improvements can be made by learning from past
mistakes. The first generation of microfinance projects,
which came into being in the 1970s and relied on
subsidized loans as a “gift” for the unbankable poor,
had dismal results.4 Huge amounts of money were lost,
because loans were seldom repaid.5 Furthermore, as
subsidized loans have a broad appeal, the money often
did not even reach members of the target group.6 The
lessons learned from these failures resulted in a new
approach to microfinance designed to prevent such
loans from being misconstrued as gifts. Such financial
“gifts”, rather than helping to develop financial-market
mechanisms, had disrupted them. This led to the
creation of the so-called market-oriented approach to
microfinance. Low-income households not served by
formal banks were regarded as clients able to repay their
loans if the MFI insisted on a repayment discipline.
Furthermore, interest rates on microloans had to be at
least as high as the market rate for larger loans in order
to make them unattractive to unintended recipients.
Henceforth, microfinance ceased to be regarded as a
vehicle for the transfer of wealth to the poor, and instead
came to be considered as an instrument for the
development of financial markets.
This first wave of institutional innovation, focusing
on credit technology and client-institution relations, has
allowed today’s MFIs to attain high repayment rates.
These successes —which, at least for some shining
examples among MFIs, translated into cost coverage,
profits and formal registration as financial institutions
(an achievement presumed impossible only a few years
before)— were the root of the dream of the “win-win
solution”. Given that this dream has not yet come true
on a large scale, the advice offered by Morduch and
others7 is to improve the institutional set-up of MFIs
and “take another hard look at management structures
and mechanism design in order to lower costs while
maintaining outreach. Doing so will be far from simple,
and it is hard to imagine substantial progress without a
second major wave of innovation” (Morduch, 1999,
p. 1609).
In fact, much innovation has taken place in this
field during the last few years, in particular regarding
the institutional set-up of MFIs and their ownership and
governance structure. The vast majority of MFIs on
which Morduch’s assessment is based are still, or at
least started off as, NGOs. The most successful of them
may have changed their legal structure during the
process of “upscaling” (i.e., while becoming formal
banks specializing in microfinance), as did the flagship
institutions of the microfinance movement in Bolivia,
BancoSol and Caja Los Andes.8 Inspired by their
successes and the dream of commercializing
microloans, donors started to experiment with
institutional alternatives to the upscaling of NGOs.
Projects to establish microloan departments in existing
institutions of the formal financial sector (i.e., to
“downscale”) were among the institutional innovations3 See Khandker, Samad and Khan (1998); Morduch (2000).
4 See Vogel (1984).
5 “The most important element of credit subsidization was not the
artificially low lending rate, but rather the fact that clever (and
influential) borrowers had a good chance of avoiding repayment of
their loans altogether”. Krahnen and Schmidt (1994, p. 20).
6 See Adams, Graham and Von Pischke (1984).
7 Such as Banerjee (2002) and Hulme and Mosley (1998).
8 See Rhyne (2001).
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that were experimented with in the 1990s. In the latter
part of the decade, donors took to another new approach.
Instead of upscaling NGOs, they set up greenfield banks
specialized in microfinance but possessing a banking
licence from the very outset. These banks were founded
as corporations, with donor institutions and private
investors acting as the shareholders. Furthermore, an
investment company specialized in equity holdings in
MFIs assumed a leading role in founding these de novo
banks. These institutional innovations sound much more
like “real” financial business than does the long drawn-
out process of transforming an NGO originally meant
to help the poor into a formal banking institution. Has
the era of commercial microfinance begun, after all?
Do these institutional innovations in building MFIs have
the potential for making the microfinance promise come
true on a bigger scale? These are the questions that the
following sections of this article will address.
Section II classifies the institutional options for
building MFIs into upscaling, downscaling and the
founding of greenfield banks. This structure is intended
to serve as a kind of theoretical basis for not only
identifying the different institutional characteristics of
these three approaches but also affording a preliminary
glimpse of their potential advantages and drawbacks.
Sections III and IV provide some empirical evidence
on selected downscaling projects and on initiatives
involving the creation of greenfield banks that may give
an initial idea of their potential. The last section draws
some preliminary conclusions.
II
Downscaling a for-profit bank:
the opposite strategy to
upscaling an NGO
Convincing an established commercial bank to hand
out microloans on its own account, without government
regulations requiring it to do so, used to be considered
a rather hopeless endeavour. After all, it was these
banks’ lack of interest in serving low-income customers
that gave rise to the idea of microfinance as a tool of
economic development. Even experts who were well
informed about the successes of the market-oriented
approach to microfinance in the 1980s and the early
1990s were rather sceptical about downscaling projects.
Hulme and Mosely, who published the results of their
research on institution-building in microfinance in
1996, concluded: “The most significant observation
must be that non-profit institutions (including public-
sector and non-governmental organizations) appear to
have a comparative advantage over for-profit
institutions in providing formal financial sector services
to poor people” (Hulme and Mosley, 1996, p. 157). They
base their assertion on three central arguments:
— The first is of an empirical nature: hardly any of
the institutions examined was a purely for-profit
company: “the only private company in our study
that was providing such services, and that had
reached a relative state of maturity, was BancoSol.
This had its origins in PRODEM, a non-
governmental organisation” (Hulme and Mosley,
1996, p. 157).
— The other two arguments are of a more theoretical
nature and refer to the institutions’ governance
structure: firstly, “private companies are simply not
prepared to provide the venture capital for
experimental services to low-income borrowers
(and savers)… The second reason relates to the
erroneous assumption that features of private-
sector management that are essential to the
effective provision of financial services (costing
and pricing services, recovering costs, promoting
a performance orientation in staff…) are found only
in for-profit concerns” (Hulme and Mosley, 1996,
pp. 157 and 158).
None of the three arguments, however, is truly
convincing. Firstly, the fact that something has not been
attempted does not mean that it cannot be done.
Secondly, private companies may not be willing to
invest venture capital in microfinance, but donors do
not expect them to. In downscaling projects, a donor
agency typically subsidizes the start-up costs of the
microloan department. Thirdly, the authors are
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undoubtedly correct in asserting that private-sector
management techniques can be transferred to non-profit
organizations. This is precisely the purpose of upscaling
an NGO and what led to the success of the market-
oriented approach to microfinance. However, an equally
or even more successful approach to building MFIs
might be to utilize the “natural” incentive of for-profit
companies to cover costs, rather than transforming a
non-profit institution geared to helping a given target
group into an organization that abides by budget
constraints and the requirements of economic
efficiency.
Nevertheless, Hulme and Mosley’s arguments
contain the key to understanding the crucial difference
in alternative institution-building approaches (table 1).
They compare non-profit with for-profit MFIs, rather
than upscaling with downscaling. By alluding to an
institution’s size and to its movement up or down a
scale, these expressions, established in the microfinance
literature to characterize the two opposing strategies
for building MFIs, are, at best, misleading. In institution-
building, size is less important than other
considerations. The key difference is the ownership and
governance structure of the partner institution that is to
be transformed into an MFI. In upscaling projects, the
typical NGO partner is a small non-profit institution that
belongs to the informal or semiformal financial sector.
A commercial bank that serves as the partner of a
downscaling project is generally a bigger entity that is
already registered as a formal financial institution.
However, the essential conditions for such a project
are the business goals and the ownership structure of
the commercial bank: for a “genuine” downscaling
project, the institution should be a private-sector for-
profit bank. If the institution is a State-owned bank, it
will have features similar to those of an NGO, regardless
of how large and formal it may be. In contrast, a private
moneylender, even if small and informal, shares key
characteristics with private commercial banks. Seen in
this light, the creation of a greenfield bank is not really
an additional option.9 In addition to the fact that creating
a de novo bank saves the time needed to transform an
existing institution, and instead requires the effort of
building an institution from the ground up, greenfield
banks may have the institutional features of either non-
profits or for-profits, depending on their ownership and
governance structure—an issue that needs to be
examined (table 1).
What are the main differences in the ownership
and governance structure of non-profits and for-profits
that determine the distinct challenges of transforming
each type of institution into a formal MFI? The most
common prejudices as to the essential difficulties faced
in institution-building and that prevent an MFI from
fulfilling its dual mission might provide the first clues.
While a non-profit partner institution would, naturally,
set out to serve the target group of the poor, it is
commonly assumed that it would encounter difficulties
in ensuring efficiency and taking the necessary steps
to cover costs. In contrast, a private bank will
supposedly strive, on its own account, to ensure cost-
efficiency and profitability. The main problem of
institution-building will be to convince the bank to serve
the target group of microclients.
These portrayals are certainly oversimplified. To
give just one example, albeit an important one: non-
profit MFIs as well as for-profit banks usually have
appointed managers, who could (mis-)use such
TABLE 1


























9 See Baydas, Graham and Valenzuela (1997).
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institutions to attain certain personal objectives instead
of meeting the needs of the target group or maximizing
profits. Therefore, one may not take for granted that
non-profits will use funds exclusively for the target
group, nor can it be assumed that cost efficiency is the
natural attribute of a for-profit bank. Nevertheless, the
common prejudices certainly contain some truth.
Indeed, the main challenge in the design of the
governance structure of a non-profit institution
—whether an NGO or a State-owned bank— is the
establishment of tight budgetary constraints that prevent
it from losing money. The main difficulties in
establishing such constraints in non-profit institutions
have to do with the structure of ownership and control:
if equity is donated to an institution or its ownership
structure is diluted, as is typically the case with State-
owned banks, there is no owner with a personal interest
in using the rights of control and accountable for the
institution’s (financial) successes and failures (table 2).
Private companies certainly have an advantage in this
regard. Not only do their owners have an incentive to
multiply their shareholder value by exercising their
rights of control, but such companies also face the threat
of insolvency if they lose their capital—a risk that also
compels appointed managers to be more cautious.
Finally, private companies usually face competition,
which limits the margin of inefficiency that each
individual company can afford. To compensate for their
weaknesses in financial sustainability, non-profits may
imitate the management techniques of for-profits
mentioned by Hulme and Mosley (1996). However,
even if the “transplant” of these for-profit techniques
into a non-profit is successful —and there are numerous
examples to the contrary—10 it is a time-consuming
and expensive proposition, as the lengthy and protracted
process of upscaling NGOs illustrates.
The ownership structure of a for-profit bank
therefore undoubtedly has advantages in cost coverage,
as a guarantor of the institution’s sustainability. The
main difficulties lie (and here, again, the most common
prejudices against for-profits contain some truth) in
achieving target-group orientation. The main barrier is
not start-up costs, because donor institutions are willing
to subsidize entry costs. It is the long-term business
prospects of serving microclients that could make a for-
profit institution unsuitable as an MFI.
While a non-profit institution will reach
sustainability as soon as it covers its operational and
financial costs and avoids decapitalization, neither a
microfinance department in a for-profit bank nor a for-
profit MFI will break even and become sustainable at
the same point. For microfinance to be lucrative and
for a for-profit institution to continue providing that
service even while donor subsidies are phased out and
the accompanying donor controls are removed, not only
must it be profitable but it must be just as profitable as
any business activity competing for a bank owner’s
limited resources. This benchmark, which determines
the sustainability of microfinance in for-profit banks,
has been referred to in microfinance literature as “full
financial sustainability”. This degree of sustainability
includes, among other things, the need to cover the
opportunity costs of the owner’s equity.
This threshold is unavoidable for a for-profit, but
it is irrelevant for the survival of a non-profit institution.
A private company that is fully integrated into the
market is considered to be driven by the goal of profit
maximization and by the forces of competition to put
scarce resources to their most efficient use. Non-profit
institutions are not bound by these market forces in the
same way. They are subject to different rules of survival
because by definition they are motivated by factors
other than purely financial ones. The simple fact that
equity is donated to an NGO frees it from the necessity
to cover the opportunity cost of equity. As long as it
does not incur losses, it could survive almost forever,
even while earning significantly less return on equity
(ROE) than a for-profit bank.
Hence, microfinance in a for-profit bank is the
touchstone of the microfinance promise: if microfinance
can be made a truly profitable business in for-profit
banks, there is no need for lifetime subsidization of non-
profit institutions. Even if such subsidies are provided
only in the form of donated equity, donor control will
always be necessary to prevent them from being
misused through organizational slack.11
For-profit MFIs do have advantages, if microfinance
can, in fact, be made a win-win solution within a limited
period of time. We need to ask if the innovations in the
institutional set-up of MFIs, namely downscaling and
10 The many failed attempts to reform State-owned policy banks
should suffice as examples.
11 This has been a recurring problem in the history of German savings
banks. Two hundred years after their founding as non-profit
institutions owned by the states and municipalities, they are still
organized as non-profit NGOs.
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TABLE 2




Risk of insolvency because owners’
funds are limited
For-profit management techniques;
competition; management under or
controlled by owner
Donor control to prevent owners from
using subsidies for more profitable,
non-target-group business
To ensure that target-group business
covers costs (including the opportunity
cost of the equity)
Until target-group business is as
profitable as alternative investments
Non-profits
“Transplanted” mechanism
Threat of insolvency if donation flow is cut off
Prevention of organizational slack through
imitation of for-profit management techniques/
donor control
Donor control to prevent managers from
misusing the institution for personal goals
To cover losses until institution is able to cover
costs and maintain equity
Equivalent to the return on equity on an
alternative investment











Is downscaling for-profit banks
worth trying?
Downscaling of this type has been tried, and,
although some of the partner commercial banks were
State-owned, there are cases of true downscaling
projects in which partner banks were privately owned
and that therefore constitute typical examples of for-
profits.
the founding of greenfield banks, actually imply
experimentation with for-profit ownership structures,
and if so, if they hold out the potential of making the
microfinance promise a reality.
1. Latin America: downscaling in Paraguay
One very prominent downscaling project was the
Programa Micro Global, which started in 1995 in
Paraguay with Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
financing.12 Eight partner institutions, of which only
12 See Schor (1997).
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one was a State-owned bank, took part in the
programme. The rest were privately owned financial
institutions (financieras) that had formerly specialized
almost exclusively in consumer loans. At all of these
institutions a microloan department was established
with donor support in the form of technical assistance.
Microloan officers were trained to issue individual loans
to microentrepreneurs using the customary microloan
technology: a careful assessment of clients’ payment
capacity, the issue of a short-term instalment loan, and
close monitoring of payment discipline, followed by
longer-term and/or larger loans if the client proved
reliable. Furthermore, the donor would offer a credit
line, distributed by a second-tier bank, to fund new
businesses. This credit line was not, however, issued
as a soft loan to the first-tier lending institution. The
only advantage of this credit line was the access it
afforded to funds with slightly longer maturities than
could be found on the financial market.
By late 1996, five institutions had proven
particularly active in the new line of business: they had
built up portfolios of between US$ 0.5 and 6 million
and issued loans for an average of US$ 1,300 and with
an average maturity of just over one year. Although the
State-owned bank was one of these five institutions,
two years after the programme began, it already showed
remarkable differences vis-à-vis the private financieras:
the average loan granted was almost double that of the
financieras (US$ 2,120 versus approximately
US$ 1,000), the average maturity was significantly
longer (22 versus 12.5 months) and the interest rate
was, at 3.3% per month, lower than that of the private
institution charging the lowest rate (4.8% per month)
and less than half that of the financiera charging the
highest rate (6.8%).13 These figures seem to suggest
that the State-owned bank was less interested in
generating profits than were the other banks, although
at that time none of the five had reached the break-
even point. However, the two largest were reported to
be approaching profitability.
At the end of the programme, in the spring of 2001,
all four of the active financieras were on the verge
of profitability. The two biggest had built up microloan
portfolios of between US$ 8 million and
US$ 12 million,14 which represented a significant
portion (25% and 70%) of their total portfolio volume
and generated much (75% and 60%) of their profit.15
All these institutions remained in the microfinance
business, and for one of them microloans are its most
important business line—in fact, its advertising touts it
as “the leader in microfinance”.16 The average loan
amount remained at US$ 1,000 over time, which is a
clear indicator that these institutions actually serve
microclients. Real annual interest rates, on loans in local
currency, are as high as 60% per year—rather high,
considering that inflation in Paraguay is below 10%.
Nevertheless, these rates are not unusual in the country.
This provides clear proof that microloan
departments established in for-profit financial
institutions in Latin America can attain full financial
sustainability. Consequently, the institutions will remain
in this line of business after subsidies for entering the
market are phased out. However, the experience in
Paraguay might not be representative of all of Latin
America. Paraguay is not the only country where
downscaling has been tried. Indeed, the Programa Micro
Global was implemented in several countries, and
Paraguay was clearly one of the most successful cases
and is probably the most successful example of true
downscaling in Latin America.17
2. Eastern Europe: downscaling in Kazakhstan
In Eastern Europe, a kind of testing ground for
institutional innovations in microfinance, the history
of projects aimed at establishing microfinance in private
commercial banks is generally much shorter;
nevertheless, it can be expected that showcase projects
with experiences comparable to those of Paraguay are
being developed. The Small Business Programme in
Kazakhstan, started in 1998 by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), may be an
outstanding example.18 Seven commercial banks either
privately owned or privatized by 2001 participated. By
late 2002, the banks had built up a microloan portfolio
of US$ 73 million. The average loan amount disbursed
is US$ 5,100 and the average amount outstanding is
US$ 4,200. These figures are four to five times higher
than in Paraguay. However, the average amount of
customary loans for all Eastern European microloan
13 Ibid.
14 See Mommertz (2001, p.8).
15 Oral information from the programme consultant.
16 See www.vision.com.py.
17 For more information, see Wenner and Campos (1998).
18 Information gathered during a visit to the programme; source of
data: www.ipcgmbh.com.
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projects is typically higher than it is in Latin America.
As of now, not much can be said about the profitability
of these microloan departments, as subsidies for
institution-building have not been phased out and
figures on contribution to profits are not publicly
available. Still, in personal interviews, the managers
of the participating banks clearly stated their long-term
commitment to microfinance because of its favourable
business prospects. Furthermore, not only is the largest
commercial bank of Kazakhstan, Kazkommertsbank,
one of the partner banks but it has also built up one of
the largest single microfinance portfolios (US$ 16.9
million). These are highly reliable indications that
microfinance will survive after the donor agencies have
ceased to support them.
Nevertheless, in Kazakhstan there are also clear
signs that banks do not consider microloans, and
especially those for smaller amounts, the most attractive
business for allocating their own resources. Firstly, most
of the banks are more interested in the medium-sized
and large individual loans granted under the Small
Business Programme. Some of the banks would even
like to see the upper limit for loans granted under the
programme raised. The supporting donors, in contrast,
have a special interest in ensuring that the programme
reaches the smaller microclients. Secondly, staff
members trained as loan officers under the Small
Business Programm are frequently promoted within the
banks to fulfil duties with greater responsibilities.
Microfinance seems to be valued because the
programme offers training and the transfer of know-
how, which are valuable in and of themselves, even if
the microloan business per se is less attractive than are
transactions with bigger clients. The drain of human
resources will most likely continue until scarce
resources used for microfinance can generate the same
profitability as those used in other lines of business.
This could occur in the near future because
Kazakhstan’s financial sector is characterized by high
competition.
Kazakhstan clearly meets the requirements for
becoming a resounding success story for the
downscaling approach. However, as with the Latin
American case, in Eastern Europe not all downscaling
projects have had equally favourable results. After a
relatively slow beginning, the programme in the
Ukraine seems as promising as the one in Kazakhstan.
The programme in Russia, the oldest in Eastern Europe,
began in 1994 but was hit hard by the Russian financial
crisis, which not only affected the quality of the loan
portfolio but also drove several partner banks into
insolvency. Only one of the partner banks, which has
the legal structure of a corporation whose largest
shareholder is the government and therefore cannot be
classified as a true for-profit partner, is still operating.
Several small projects, such as those in Armenia,
Romania and Macedonia, are either too recent to allow
a prognosis or are less promising than the Kazakhstan
project.
Although the evidence on downscaling provided
here comes down to two rather successful cases, some
preliminary conclusions on the potential of establishing
microfinance departments in for-profit financial
institutions can be drawn:
— Successful examples do exist, but they are (still) rare.
— Those examples have the following characteristics:
• The financial market in both countries is very
competitive, and existing for-profit institutions
are therefore always looking for new business.
• The financial market for microclients is not
sufficiently covered by established non-profit
institutions, which offer the same product but
have the competitive advantage of being
precisely that: non-profits.
In sum, microfinance with for-profits is possible,
but thus far the successful examples do not indicate
that the era of commercial microfinance is under way.19
19 Mommertz (2001) and Berger (2000) arrive at similar conclusions.
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The sample of greenfield banks surveyed here covers
some of the most prominent but certainly not all the
greenfield banks that might have been founded around
the world. All of the MFIs mentioned here belong to the
same “microfinance network”, encompassing donor
institutions, a microfinance investment company, a
consulting firm specializing in development finance and
the micro banks themselves. Within this sample, the
greenfield bank approach was first applied to Eastern
European countries in transition. The first MFI, called
Micro Enterprise Bank (MEB), was founded in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1997, followed soon afterwards by
FEFAD Bank, in Albania. Meanwhile the greenfield bank
approach has extended to Africa, Latin America and
Asia, although with only one or two institutions on these
continents. To date, most of the 15 greenfield banks
are located in Eastern Europe.
As all these MFIs had a formal banking or financial
institution licence from the outset, most of them are
already offering, or at least aim to offer, complete
banking services. Besides micro- and small-business
loans and time and savings deposits, both in local and
foreign currencies, these banks offer payment services,
and some also issue letters of credit or traveller’s
cheques. Obviously, these banks do not want their
microclients to transfer their transactions to other formal
banks once they become small or medium-sized firms.
On the contrary: the greenfield banks aim to become
established players in the local financial market.
The approach to building these banks was always
similar. The banks were legally established as
corporations, and the local minimum-equity
requirements for founding a bank were met with funds
raised from donor agencies.
As shown in table 3, which gives an overview of
the ownership structure of the banks under
consideration, the donors that appear as shareholders
of all of these banks are, in general, the same: the
German development bank Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW); International Finance Corporation
(IFC), of the World Bank Group; Netherlands
Development Finance Company (FMO); the Dutch
foundation DOEN; the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). At the same
time, the donor community holds a majority interest in
almost all of these banks.
The fact that the donors have a majority holding
leads to one important conclusion: although these banks
have the legal status of private companies and the
governance structure of corporations with appointed
managers and a supervisory board, they cannot be
considered “truly” private. The legal structure is merely
an instrument that donors use to experiment with
institutional innovations in development finance.
However, the fact that a majority of the
shareholders of these banks are non-profit institutions
does not imply that private investors are not at all
involved. One of the shareholders is a financial institution
that operates solely for profit—Commerzbank, a big
German commercial bank. Interestingly enough, this
bank has invested exclusively in Eastern European
banks, which might indicate that these banks’ business
prospects make them more attractive for private
investors than would investing in a microbank in Ghana
or Haiti.
One additional investor appears in all of these
banks: IMI AG, a German investment company that
specializes in holding equity participation in
microbanks.20 Most of its investments are in shares of
these greenfield banks, although it has also invested in
MFIs created via upscaling, such as Caja Los Andes, in
Bolivia, or Calpiá, in El Salvador. The legal status of
IMI AG is that of a private company, but it is justifiably
characterized as a mixture of a for-profit and a non-
profit company. An examination of the shareholder
structure of IMI AG reveals a near duplication of that of
the microbanks themselves, since its majority interest
is held by the same non-profit institutions. The





20 See IMI, http://www.imi-ag.de.
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Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG), which belongs to the
KfW, holds 14% of the shares; IFC, 16%; DOEN, 16%;
FMO, 14.5%; BIO, the Belgian Investment Company for
Developing Countries (BIO), another 7%; and
ProCredito, a Bolivian foundation involved in
microfinance, 6%.
However, there are two purely private investors:
IPC GmbH (19.5%) and IPC Invest (7%). IPC GmbH
specializes in providing consulting services for
microfinance; IPC Invest is a vehicle for IPC employees
to invest their own savings. This is undoubtedly a very
special set of private investors: the investments are
made exclusively by private individuals who at the
same time receive income from the microfinance
consulting business and who, furthermore, are involved
in the institution-building process of the microbanks,
since their employer, IPC GmbH, is contracted by the
donor agencies to provide management services for
the microbanks during the initial institution-building
phase. These private investors, who through IMI AG
hold an indirect equity participation in the greenfield
banks, complete the greenfield banks’ institutional
structure.
The greenfield microbanks as well as the
investment company IMI AG have a truly innovative
institutional structure:
— Behind the facade of for-profit companies is a
mixture of non-profit and for-profit investors—a
mixture that with little effort can be fine-tuned in
keeping with the business prospects of any local
MFI and, in general, of any microfinance. When
microfinancing not only covers expenses but also
begins to recover the opportunity cost on equity,
then the microbank is performing well enough to
be truly privatized. At this point, the structure of
the shareholders could be changed by donors
selling their shares to private investors. Similarly,
when investments in MFIs have become truly
competitive, donors could exit IMI AG, which could
even go public.
— The similarity in the ownership structure of all
these greenfield banks ensures information sharing,
coordination and thereby the realisation of
economies of scale related to control over
investments and the accumulation of know-how.
— Furthermore, the fact that the consulting company
IPC and its employees hold an indirect interest in
the microbanks while simultaneously working,
under a management services contract, for them,
is a variation of a new incentive model. This model,
called “consulting for equity”, has recently emerged
in Western industrialized countries. The basic idea
TABLE 3
Ownership structure of greenfield banks
(Percentages)
Development institutions (non-profit) Mixed For-profit Others
(for-profit or
KfW IFC FMO DOEN EBRD IMI Commerzbank non-profit)
Eastern Europe
Micro Enterprise Bank,
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8 23 12 - 23 22 12
Microfinance Bank of Georgia 20 16 10 - 10 29 15
Micro Enterprise Bank, Kosovo 16 16 16 - 16 16 16
FEFAD Bank, Albania 25 20 - - 20 15 20
Micro Enterprise Credit, Moldova - 15 - 15 15 40 - 15
Micro Finance Bank, Serbia 16 16 16 - 16 16 16
Microfinance Bank, Ukraine 20 20 - 10 20 10 - 20
ProCredit Bank, Bulgaria 20 20 - - 20 20 20
MIRO Bank, Romania 20 20 10 - 20 10 20
Latin America
Micro Credit National, Haiti - 20 15 - - 20 - 45
Sociedad Financiera Ecuatorial,
Ecuador - - - 33 - 56 - 11
Rest of world
NovoBanco, Mozambique - 13 13 13 - 25 - 35
MEB, Philippines - 10 10 20 - 20 - 40
Sikaman SLC, Ghana - 25 20 20 - 32 - 3
Source: Internationale Micro Investitionen Aktiengesellschaft (IMI), www.imi-ag.de.
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behind it is to give consultants an incentive to act
in the interest of the owners of a business that uses
their consulting services. If the consulting service
is successful, the consultants take part in the
success, since the value of their shares rises.
Likewise, if the consultants fail to solve problems,
their equity holding earns no income.
How well has this institutional network, which was
built in the last five years around the founding of
greenfield banks, performed?
Concerning outreach21 and target-group orientation,
the success of the greenfield banks is impressive, as
table 4 shows.
In fact, the average amount of the loans in Eastern
Europe is significantly higher than that of those
extended by, for example, the Latin American
institutions. This reflects the different environment in
the transition countries as well as, perhaps, a different
definition of the target groups of the Eastern European
banks, which do not aim to serve the poorest of the
poor. All the institutions under consideration show very
low rates of arrears (figure 2), which is consistent with
a moderate level of write-offs. However, the question
of whether “high repayment rates translated into profit”
remains (Morduch, 1999, p. 1571).
Table 5, which examines the return on equity
realized by all greenfield banks, may provide a
preliminary, although not altogether unbiased,
impression.
In their official accounting reports, audited by
recognized external auditing firms, the vast majority of
MFIs more than two years old report a profit. Naturally,
and unfortunately for academics interested in having
statistics on the success of this institution-building
approach, the official accounting data do not reflect the
degree to which an institution still needs subsidies. These
institutions may continue to receive subsidies, either in
the form of technical assistance paid for by the donors
(such payments for managerial services would not even
appear on an institution’s books) or in the form of soft
loans. To get a more realistic picture one would require
“shadow” accounting data corrected to include subsidies
—data that are not publicly available. However, the
following information may give a first insight.
— After two to three years, banks should be able to
cover their administrative costs, including
management salaries. All banks that had begun
operations two or three years before, and even some
banks that had been created more recently, met this
target.21 See Gonzalez-Vega (1998).
FIGURE 1
Governance structure of the greenfield bank network
Source: Prepared by the author.
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FIGURE 2
Greenfield banks: Arrears, December 2002
(Percentages)
TABLE 4
Greenfield banks: Outreach and target-group orientation
Total amount of loans outstanding Average amount of Number of loans
December 2002 (thousand of euros) outstanding loans (euros) outstanding
MEB, Bosnia and Herzegovina 33 533 4 513 7 077
FEFAD, Albania 29 826 5 227 5 434
MBG, Georgia 33 098 1 110 29 815
MEB, Kosovo 23 731 5 018 4 504
MEC, Moldova 3 992 3 593 1 111
ProCredit, Bulgaria 29 317 5 467 5 107
MFB, Ukraine 26 055 4 098 6 056
MFB, Serbia 40 133 3 844 9 942
MIRO, Romania 10 104 3 900 2 591
MCN, Haiti 2 981 881 3 383
SFE, Ecuador 6 746 1 293 5 217
NovoBanco, Mozambique 1 998 277 7 212
MEB, Philippines 360 201 1 794
Sikaman, Ghana 282 552 487
Benchmark institutionsa/
Caja Los Andes, Bolivia 61 272 1 200 51 073
Calpiá, El Salvador 42 717 954 44 771
CONFIA, Nicaragua 15 023 736 20 418
Source: IMI AG.
a/ NGOs that had already been upscaled to microbanks.
Source: IMI AG.
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— To create a greenfield bank from the ground up,
including a home office and one or two branches,
and for it to attain sustainability, in the sense of
covering all expenses, an average of 1.5 to 2 million
euros in subsidies is required. Naturally, this
amount will depend on the size of the bank.
— Three of the microbanks (FEFAD Bank, of Albania;
MEB, of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and MEB
Kosovo) no longer receive direct subsidies. Only
MEB’s results are affected by soft loans.
Two or three of these banks, therefore, appear to
be profitable, despite having existed for only a short
period. However, the ROE is probably insufficient to
cover the opportunity cost of equity that a private
investor would calculate, taking the country risk into
account. Furthermore, ROE alone is not sufficient for a
comparison of the profitability of investments. For a
profitability assessment based on net present values,
the total cost of investments and the amount that can
be invested with a certain average rate of return need
to be taken into account. Nevertheless, the data
presented suggest that progress has been made in
building MFIs, aided by intelligent and innovative
ownership and governance structures.
It would be unfair, however, to conclude that these
institutional innovations have brought the microfinance
promise much closer to realization. The reason for this
is given in the following section.
TABLE 5
Profitability of greenfield banks throughout the world
Return Equity Profits
December 2002 Year founded  on equity (millions of euros) (millions of euros)
Eastern Europe
Micro Enterprise Bank, Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1997 8% 7 0.56
Microfinance Bank of Georgia 1999 -1% 11 -0.11
Micro Enterprise Bank, Kosovo 1999 53% 7 3.71
FEFAD Bank, Albania 1999 15% 7 1.05
Micro Enterprise Credit, Moldova 2000 -7% 5 -0.35
Micro Finance Bank, Serbia 2001 -26% 14 -3.64
Microfinance Bank, Ukraine 2001 -1.9% 10 -0.19
ProCredit Bank, Bulgaria 2001 1% 7 0.07
MIRO Bank, Romania 2002 -9% 10 -0.9
Latin America
Micro Crédit National, Haiti 2000 27% 2 0.54
Sociedad Financiera Ecuatorial,
Ecuador 2001 10% 3 0.3
Rest of world
NovoBanco, Mozambique 2000 -6% 2 -0.12
Micro Enterprise Bank, Philippines 2001 -11% 2 -0.22
Sikaman SLC, Ghana 2002 -5% 2 -0.1
Benchmark institutionsa/
Financiera Calpiá, El Salvador 1988 11% 11 1.21
Financiera CONFIA, Nicaragua 1990 18% 3 0.54
Caja Los Andes, Bolivia 1992 13% 10 1.3
Source:  Internationale Micro Investitionen Aktiengesellschaft (IMI), www.imi-ag.de.
a/ NGOs that had already been upscaled to microbanks.
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Institutional innovation was characteristic of the
“microfinance industry” at the end of the 1990s and at
the beginning of the new millennium. The term
“microfinance industry” was deliberately chosen
because these innovations were, undoubtedly, carried
out by the faction of the microfinance movement that
believes in microfinance more as an instrument for
developing financial markets than as a development tool
for directly fighting poverty. For this reason, the
duration and degree of subsidization required to achieve
financial sustainability are used as the main indicator
of success, rather than a cost-benefit measure of the
impact on poverty per dollar spent.
If such a cost-benefit measure were applied,
institutions that reach much poorer clients and raise their
income might possibly receive a more favourable
evaluation than the greenfield banks discussed above,
even if the former continued to depend on subsidies
(Morduch, 1999, pp. 1592-1595). There is little point
in carrying out a more in-depth analysis here because
—to cite Morduch’s seminal paper again—
“unfortunately, for now policy makers have little to go
on beyond a handful of case studies and…theoretical
examples and counter examples” (ibid., 1595). In all
fairness, it has to be stressed that none of the institutions
examined in this paper claim that their mission is to
serve the poorest of the poor, even if some members of
this segment of the population are among their
customers. The concept of for-profit microfinance, as
well as the founding of greenfield banks, seeks to
develop the financial market by reaching customers who
have not yet been served, but in a top-down rather than
a bottom-up manner. In the light of this development
goal, the time and money invested to achieve financial
V
Conclusion and outlook
sustainability seems to be a pragmatic, but acceptable,
yardstick.
The use of this yardstick —albeit, due to a lack of
information, as a very rough estimate— reveals some
noteworthy examples of downscaling as well as of
greenfield banks with very satisfactory performance. It
cannot be ruled out, however, that most of the success of
greenfield banks is attributable to the special economic
situation of the transition countries. And, regarding
downscaling projects, the very fact that few of them have
been successful and that donors support the founding of
greenfield banks with mixed ownership, even in some
countries where the downscaling approach is
simultaneously supported, seems to indicate that the day
when microfinance will provide a win-win solution is
still far off. And, last but not least, it should be mentioned
that the new institutional model of greenfield banks might
produce new institutional issues. To name just a few:
— Does the new “consulting for equity” incentive
model, meant to bring the interests of consultants
in line with those of donors, have the potential to
lead to new incentive problems, as well? (Sties,
2003).
— What is the optimal exit point for the donor-owners
of greenfield banks? And how is it guaranteed that
such an exit will actually be executed?
— Could the founding of greenfield banks with mixed
ownership constitute the future barrier to the entry
of private banks into the microfinance business,
with the adverse effect that institutions meant to
develop the financial market would contribute to
market distortions?
Much more research is required to give satisfactory
answers.
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